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Incentive to manage earnings
International comparison
A B S T R A C T
Previous investigations have shown that when earnings meet analysts forecasts, the market reacts positively,
and when these forecasts are not reached, the market reacts negatively. For this reason, forecasts become
goals to beat, and as the literature has revealed, this creates an incentive for earnings management. The
present paper extends prior research, providing evidence that the magnitude of the reward (penalty) for
companies meeting (failing to meet) earnings forecasts differs depending on the market. In addition, it
reveals that the strength of the incentive for companies to manage their earnings differs depending on the
market in which they are listed. We compare six stock markets and find that the most powerful incentives
arise when the reward for meeting the forecasts or the penalty for not doing so is greater.
©2021 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the











Una comparación internacional del incentivo para manipular el resultado con el
objetivo de alcanzar los pronósticos de los analistas
R E S U M E N
Investigaciones previas han evidenciado que cuando los resultados alcanzan, o superan, los pronósticos
de los analistas, el mercado reacciona positivamente, mientras que, cuando dichos pronósticos no son
alcanzados, la reacción del mercado es la contraria. Por ello, los pronósticos se convierten en metas a batir
y, tal como la literatura ya ha contrastado, surge un incentivo para la manipulación del resultado. En este
contexto, el presente trabajo va más allá, evidenciando que la reacción positiva o negativa es de diferente
magnitud según los mercados y que ello explica que la fuerza con la que las empresas perciben el incentivo
a manipular los resultados para alcanzar dichos pronósticos también sea diferente según el mercado en el
que cotiza. Comparando seis mercados, obtenemos que el incentivo es más potente cuanto mayor es el
premio por cumplir los pronósticos, o la penalización por no hacerlo.
©2021 ASEPUC. Publicado por EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. Este es un artículo Open Access bajo la
licencia CC BY-NC-ND (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
https://www.doi.org/10.6018/rcsar.357771
©2021 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Earnings announcements are very important events for in-
vestors because, when they take place, investors can know
whether the company’s actual earnings match analysts’ fore-
casts. Meeting (failing to meet) these forecasts has a pos-
itive (negative) impact on the company’s stock prices and
return, as found by Edmonds, Edmonds, Fu, and Jenkins
(2018), Kinney, Burgstahler, and Martin (2002), López and
Rees (2002) and Skinner and Sloan (2002), among others.
This is why forecasts are an important target to reach and,
like other targets, meeting forecasts may be an incentive for
earnings management. The link between analysts’ forecasts
and earnings management has been highlighted in several
studies, including those by Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003a,
2003b), Burgstahler and Eames (2006), Callao and Jarne
(2018), Cheng and Warfield (2005), Das and Zhang (2003),
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2000), Matsumoto (2002), Payne
and Robb (2000) and Plummer and Mest (2001).
We think that the impact of meeting or failing to meet earn-
ings forecasts on the stock return—that is, the magnitude of
the reward for meeting forecasts or the penalty for not doing
so—may differ between stock markets and that the strength
of the incentive for earnings management in order to meet
forecasts may be linked to the magnitude of the reward or
penalty. These topics have not been investigated until the
present paper.
We consider six indexes that represent six stock markets
that are located in different geographic areas and that have
different characteristics (legal origin, financial development,
analysts following the companies, accuracy of the forecasts
and gross domestic product GDP per capita). These aspects
may influence the markets’ response to compliance or non-
compliance with forecasts as well as firms’ attitudes regard-
ing earnings management. The six indexes are Bovespa
(Brazil), DAX (Germany), Dow Jones (US), FTSE (UK), Hang
Seng (Hong Kong) and IBEX (Spain).
Our results show that the magnitude of the market reaction
(i.e. the reward or punishment) differs between markets. A
code law system, less financial development and less wealth
drive greater market reactions. In addition, the market reac-
tion increases when the number of analysts following a firm
increases and when these analysts forecast with more accur-
acy. Furthermore, our results show that the magnitude of
the market reaction explains differences in the strength of
the perceived incentives for companies to perform earnings
management to meet forecasts. The greater the reward or
penalty, the stronger the incentive for earnings management.
That is, when meeting forecasts has a higher impact on the
stock return, there is a higher probability that a company will
manage its earnings to meet forecasts.
Previous studies have highlighted the importance of earn-
ings management in listed companies (see, for example, Di-
chev, Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2016). Our study contrib-
utes to the literature on earnings management and its impact
on the stock market. First, the results of an international com-
parison reveal differences in the magnitude of the market’s
reward for meeting forecasts. Second, the results show that
the incentive to manage earnings in order to meet forecasts
is not independent of the market in which the company is
listed.
The results we obtained may be useful for investors, audit-
ors, analysts and capital markets in general, as they provide
information about the process that is set in motion when ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts are published and how this can influ-
ence the reliability of financial information. Investors and
analysts may find our results particularly useful when inter-
preting financial information to make investment decisions
or create forecasts and recommendations. The findings in-
dicate that auditors should be more vigilant in their work for
firms listed in stock markets, for which the incentive to man-
age earnings is greater due to the market’s stronger reaction
when these firms meet or fail to meet forecasts.
The next section reviews the literature on this issue. Sec-
tion 3 describes the sample, and Section 4 explains the meth-
odology. In Section 5, we collate the results. Section 6
presents our sensitivity analysis, and in Section 7, we discuss
the relevant conclusions we can draw from the results.
2. Literature review
Financial analysts’ opinions and recommendations regard-
ing investors and their investment decisions have an import-
ant impact on the share prices of listed companies. Analysts’
forecasts are highly relevant to investors, companies and the
market in general, because, as Larrán and Rees (1999) state,
they represent an approximation of the market’s expectations
for the company.
When a company’s actual earnings are announced and the
market knows whether it met its earnings forecast, the com-
pany’s share prices will change. Previous studies (e.g. Bartov,
Givoly, & Hayn, 2002; Edmonds et al., 2018; Kasznik & Mc-
Nichols, 2002; Kinney et al., 2002; López & Rees, 2002; Skin-
ner & Sloan, 2002) have analysed these market reactions and
found that a negative adjustment to share prices occurs when
earnings fail to meet forecasts and a positive one occurs when
earnings meet or exceed forecasts. In absolute terms, the
penalty for failing to meet forecasts is significantly greater
than the reward for exceeding them. In addition, firms that
continuously meet expectations are valued more highly than
those that only meet them occasionally (Bartov et al., 2002;
Kasznik & McNichols, 2002; López & Rees, 2002). This mar-
ket behaviour justifies the fact that earnings forecasts are be-
coming goals for companies to meet.
Analysis of the evolution of earnings over time revealed a
decreasing tendency to report earnings that fall slightly short
of analysts’ forecasts and an increasing tendency towards pos-
itive earnings deviations (Barua, Hoon, & Yi, 2019; Brown,
2003; López & Rees, 2002). When there is a goal to be met,
such as earnings forecasts, there is an incentive to manage
earnings when non-managed earnings do not meet the goal
(Caneghem, 2002; Embong & Hosseini, 2018; García Osma,
Gill de Albornoz, & Gisbert, 2005; Niskanen & Keloharju,
2000)1. Previous studies examining the link between earn-
ings forecasts and earnings management have provided evid-
ence that earnings are managed upward to meet earnings
forecasts (Callao & Jarne, 2018; Dechow et al., 2000; Mat-
sumoto, 2002; Payne & Robb, 2000; Zhang, Perols, Robinson,
& Smith, 2018). In addition, it has been found that compan-
ies manage earnings to meet earnings forecasts, but show-
ing slight positive earnings deviations (Abarbanell & Lehavy,
2003b; Cheng & Warfield, 2005).
To date, the literature has examined the impact of meeting
or failing to meet earnings forecasts on the market, including
rewards and punishments for the company. The results have
shown that meeting forecasts is a goal for companies and
this leads to an incentive for earnings management. How-
ever, studies have not investigated whether the magnitude of
1The incentives to manage earnings that have been studied in the liter-
ature include, among others, those related to debt contracts, management
remuneration, tax effects and earnings benchmarks (positive earnings, pos-
itive earnings variation, earnings forecasts).
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the reward (penalty) for meeting (failing to meet) forecasts
differs between markets or, if so, the implications of these dif-
ferences on the probability of feeling an incentive to manage
earnings. The present work aims to help fill this gap.
The markets under study are located in different geo-
graphic areas, in countries with different legal systems, levels
of financial development, wealth, different numbers of ana-
lysts following companies and different manners of working.
A priori, it is expected that comparison of markets with dif-
ferent characteristics will reveal differences in the magnitude
of rewards/penalties between markets. If this is the case, we
think that companies are more likely to feel an incentive to
manage earnings in order to meet forecasts when they trade
in markets in which the magnitude of the reward for meeting
these forecasts, or the penalty for not doing so, is higher.
Based on this, we formulated and tested the following hy-
potheses, stated in the alternate form:
H1: There are significant differences between markets in
the magnitude of the reward (penalty) for meeting (failing
to meet) earnings forecasts.
H2: The magnitude of the reward (penalty) offered by the
market for meeting (failing to meet) earnings forecasts influ-
ences the probability that companies will perceive an incent-
ive to manage earnings.
3. Sample
To test H1 and H2, we created a sample composed of com-
panies listed in six stock indexes: Bovespa, DAX, Dow Jones,
FTSE, Hang Seng and IBEX. In total, we identified 306 com-
panies2, but after removal of 82 financial companies, the final
sample was comprised of 224 companies. The period of ana-
lysis covers the years from 2006 to 2015, providing us with
2,240 observations. The market distribution of these obser-




Working with these indexes, we will be able to compare
markets that are located in different geographic areas and
that have different characteristics, which may influence their
response to compliance or non-compliance with forecasts as
well as firms’ attitudes regarding earnings management. Spe-
cifically, we considered the following aspects: legal origin
(common law or code law), level of financial development
(low, medium, high), number of analysts following the com-
panies, accuracy of forecasts and GDP per capita. Table 2
shows these aspects of the different countries and markets.
As shown in the table, we included three code law coun-
tries (Germany, Spain and Brazil), which have a greater need
2Sixty-one companies from the Bovespa Index, 30 from the DAX, 30
from the Dow Jones, 100 from the FTSE, 50 from the Hang Seng Index and
35 from the IBEX.
Table 2
Characteristics of the markets and countries
1 Taken from Djankov et al. (2007). Code (Common) indicates a code-law (commom-
law) country
2 As in Degeorge et al. (2013), the level of financial development is measured by
Finance-Aggregate (Beck & Levine, 2002)
3 It is the mean of analysts following the companies listed in the Index from 2006 to
2015 (data from I/B/E/S)
4 It is the mean of the absolute difference between actual earnings and earnings forecast
scaled by earnings forecast for companies listed in the Index from 2006 to 2015 (actual
earnings from DATSTREAM and earnings forecast from I/B/E/S)
5 It is the mean of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in $ USA from 2006 to
2015 (data from World Bank)
for protection and state control over law enforcers (Siems,
2007). The other three countries (the US, the UK and Hong
Kong) have common law countries in which the legal system
relies on judges’ decisions rather than strict codes.
We selected countries with different levels of financial de-
velopment, measured by the finance aggregate variable de-
veloped by Beck and Levine (2002) and used by Degeorge
et al. (2013). Specifically, we considered countries with the
highest level of financial development (US), a medium level
of development (UK, Germany and Spain) and a low level of
development (Brazil)3.
The number of analysts following companies also differs
between markets. From 2006–2015, the average ranged
from 10 analysts in the Brazilian market to more than 25
in the German market.
Forecast accuracy is measured by the deviation of actual
earnings from the earnings forecast. Thus, lower deviation
means higher accuracy. In our sample, based on the com-
panies listed in the indexes under study, the markets with a
higher degree of forecast accuracy are US and UK, and those
with lower accuracy are Spain and Brazil.
Finally, the sample is comprised of markets located in coun-
tries with different levels of economic development, meas-
ured by GDP per capita. From 2006–2015, this ranged from
$11,000 (Brazil) to almost $50,000 (US).
4. Methodology
This section describes the methodology we employ in the
study. First, we test H1: there are significant differences
between markets in the magnitude of the reward (penalty)
for meeting (failing to meet) earnings forecasts. The vari-
ables used to test H1 are defined in Annex 1.
To measure the magnitude of the reward (penalty) for
meeting (failing to meet) earnings forecasts, we examine the
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the earnings an-
nouncement date, when the earnings deviation from the fore-
cast is known4. The variable we use is the mean of the abso-
lute CAR values of the shares listed in each market in a ± 1
window around earnings announcement date. We use abso-
lute values of CAR because we aim to quantify the market’s
3Hong Kong is not included in Beck and Levine’s (2002) variable.
4Cumulative abnormal return has been used in previous research to
measure the impact of an event on the stock return (see Bartov et al., 2002;
Kinney et al., 2002; López & Rees, 2002; Skinner & Sloan, 2002).
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reward (in which case CAR would have a positive value) or
penalty (in which case CAR would have a negative value).
Annex 2 shows how the (mean |CAR|) variable is computed.
The data are obtained from Datastream (actual data) and
I/B/E/S (forecasted data).
To test H1, we use the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test
(Kruskal & Wallis, 1952) since the results of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests (Kolmogorov, 1933; Sha-
piro & Wilk, 1965; Smirnov, 1939) showed that the variable
mean |CAR| does not follow a normal distribution (Table 3).
We also test the significance of differences in this variable
for market pairs using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test
(Mann & Whitney, 1947).
Table 3
Results from Normality tests
│ │
 
mean|CAR| is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal re-
turn in a -1+1 window around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in the
indexes under study. It measures the reward (or penalty) for meeting (or failing) to
meet earnings forecasts.
To explain differences in the markets’ reactions to com-
panies meeting or not meeting earnings forecasts, we per-
form a regression (equation 1) in which mean |CAR| is the
dependent variable and the explanatory variables are those
considered relevant for the sample selection:
mean
CARjt =α0 +α1 LEGj +α2F IN DEVj +α3AFOLLit




CARjt  is the dependent variable, which quantifies
the average reward (penalty) in market j during period
t for meeting (failing to meet) earnings forecasts. It is
defined as the mean of the absolute CAR values in a ±
1 window around the earnings announcement date for
firms listed in index j in period t
LEGj is a dichotomous variable representing the legal sys-
tem of country j, which takes a value of 0 for a com-
mon law system and a value of 1 for a code law sys-
tem, in line with the classification proposed by Djankov,
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007).
F IN DEVj measures the level of financial development for
country j based on the finance aggregate variable de-
veloped by Beck and Levine (2002).
AFOLLit is the number of analysts following company i in
period t (data extracted from I/B/E/S).
ACCit is the absolute difference between actual earnings and
an earnings forecast scaled by the earnings forecast for
company i in period t (actual data extracted from Data-
stream and forecasted data extracted from I/B/E/S).
lGDPjt is the logarithm of GDP per capita for country j in
period t (data obtained from World Bank).
Below, we explain the variables used in the regression as
well as the expected signs regarding the relationship between
the independent variables and the dependent one.
Dependent variable (mean|CARjt|): This variable is
defined as the mean of the absolute values of the cumulat-
ive abnormal return of the shares listed in a certain market
in a ± 1 window around earnings announcement date, when
it is known whether a company’s earnings met the forecasts.
It measures the average reward (penalty) in market j during
period t for meeting (failing to meet) earnings forecasts. The
variable is calculated for each studied year according to the
process explained in Annex 2.
Explanatory variables: We introduce five explanatory
variables in the model:
• Legal origin (LEG): Code law systems follow the Roman
legal tradition, which is characterised by fact-finding con-
ducted by state-employed judges, automatic review of de-
cisions and reliance on codes rather than judicial discre-
tion. In contrast, common law systems rely on fact-finding
by juries, independent judges, infrequent appeals and flex-
ible codes.
Investors in code law countries usually rely on financial re-
porting regulated by law, and analysts’ forecasts could be
less valued than in common law countries. Thus, we could
expect a weaker market reaction to meeting or failing to
meet earnings forecasts in code law countries; that is, we
could expect the sign for the coefficient of LEG to be negat-
ive. On the other hand, code law countries feature less of
a stock market tradition than common law countries and
investors have fewer decision tools, giving greater value to
accessible tools like analysts’ forecasts. This would cause
the market reaction to be greater and the expected sign
of the coefficient of LEG to be positive. Consequently, we
are not able to predict the sign of the relationship between
LEG and the dependent variable.
• Financial development (F IN DEV ): This variable is based
on the finance aggregate variable (Beck & Levine, 2002).
It is a measure of the degree to which national financial sys-
tems are used to assess firms, monitor managers, facilitate
risk management, and mobilise savings. This variable has
two main components: finance activity, which is a meas-
ure of the overall activity of the financial intermediaries
and markets, and finance size, which is a measure of the
overall size of the financial sector. The expected sign of
the coefficient of F IN DEV is negative because a higher
level of financial development implies that more inform-
ation is available in the market to make decisions. This
makes the earnings forecasts relatively less relevant to the
market, and therefore the reaction to meeting (or failing
to meet) forecasts is lower.
• Number of analysts following (AFOLL): This variable is
defined as the number of analysts following companies
in the market. We expect a positive relationship between
AFOLL and the dependent variable. When there are more
analysts following companies, the analysts’ forecasts are
more relevant and reliable for investors, and so the share
price reaction to meeting or failing to meet earnings fore-
casts will be greater.
• Accuracy (ACC): When the accuracy of forecasts is higher,
the market’s surprise at deviations from forecasts is greater,
causing a stronger market reaction. Given that we meas-
ure this variable as the deviation of actual earnings with
respect to earnings forecasts, lower values indicate greater
accuracy. Thus, it is expected that the sign of the coefficient
of this variable will be negative.
• Logarithm of GDP per capita (lGDP): This variable meas-
ures the economic development of each country. The
higher the GDP per capita, the more wealth is available to
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investors to make investments. In relative terms, the im-
pact of positive news (compliance with forecasts) or neg-
ative news (non-compliance) will have a lower impact on
wealthier investors, while investors with less wealth will
be more sensitive to this news and the market reaction will
be higher. Thus, we expect the sign for the coefficient of
lGDP to be negative.
Finally, we test hypothesis H2: the magnitude of the re-
ward (penalty) offered by the market for meeting (not meet-
ing) earnings forecasts influences the probability that a com-
pany will perceive an incentive to manage earnings.
To do so, we perform a logistic regression (equation 2) in
which ITVE is the dependent variable, mean |CAR| is the ex-
planatory variable, and the other variables are control vari-
ables. The variables used to test H2 are defined in Annex 1.
I T V Eit =α0 +α1mean
CARjt−1+α2 LIQit +α3SOLVit
+α4DEBTit +α5ROIit ++α6SI Z Eit
+α7varGDPt +α8rotMKTjt + eit
(2)
where:
I T V Eit is the dependent variable, which represents the in-
centive of firm i in period t to manage earnings upward
to meet earnings forecasts. Its value is 1 for firms with the
incentive to manage earnings and 0 otherwise. Its compu-
tation is presented in Annex 2.
mean
CARjt−1 is the explanatory variable, which quantifies
the average reward (or penalty) in market j in period t−1
for meeting (or failing to meet) earnings forecasts. It is
defined as the mean absolute CAR value in a ± 1 window
around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in
index j in period t-1. Its computation is presented in Annex
2.
LIQit is the liquidity ratio for firm i in period t, which we
define as the quotient between current assets and current
liabilities (data extracted from Datastream).
SOLVit is the solvency ratio for firm i in period t, which we
define as the quotient between total assets and total liabil-
ities (data extracted from Datastream).
DEBTit is the debt ratio for firm i in period t, which we
define as the quotient between liabilities and equity (data
extracted from Datastream).
ROIit is the return on investment for firm i in period t, which
we define as the quotient between operating profits and
total assets (data extracted from Datastream).
SI Z Eit measures the size of firm i in period t, which we
define using the asset logarithm (data extracted from Data-
stream).
varGDPt is the percentage variation in GDP between year t
and t−1 in the country in which market j is located (data
obtained from World Bank)
rotMKTjt is a proxy of the liquidity of market j in period t,
which we define as the quotient between trade volume and
market capitalisation at the end of year t (data extracted
from Datastream)
Below, we explain the variables in the regression as well as
the expected signs of the relationships between independent
variables and the dependent one.
Dependent variable (ITVE): This variable identifies the in-
centive to upwardly manage earnings to meet earnings fore-
casts. It is a dichotomous variable whose value is 1 for firms
that have the incentive to manage earnings upwards and they
do so. The value is 0 for firms without the incentive to man-
age earnings upwards to meet forecasts because they met
them without earnings management.
To assign a value of 1 or 0 to the variable, we have to know
whether the company has managed earnings upward or not.
In order to do so, we use discretionary accruals (DA), which
is the most common methodology in the literature for detect-
ing earnings management (García Osma et al., 2005; McNich-
ols, 2000). Accruals are defined as the part of earnings that
does not involve cash flow and therefore are more likely to be
manipulated by managers. However, not all accruals can be
managed, so we can distinguish between non-discretionary
accruals (N DA), which are not manipulated by management
since they depend on the economic circumstances of the com-
pany, and discretionary accruals, which are subject to the dis-
cretion of the management and therefore vulnerable to being
managed5.
Since it is possible to observe total accrual (TA), the non-
discretionary accruals (N DA) are estimated to subsequently
calculate the discretionary component (DA) as the differ-
ence between the total accruals and the estimated non-
discretionary accruals6. A positive value of DA indicates up-
wards earnings management, and a negative one indicates
downwards earnings management. We draw upon Dechow,
Sloan, and Sweene (1995) model, as we explain in Annex 2.
The descriptive statistics for DA obtained from this model are
shown in Table 4.
Table 4
















DA (INDEX): Discretionary accruals obtained from the estimation of Dechow et al.













DAit is the discretionary accruals for firm i in period t and
a1, a2 and a3 are the estimated values of parameters α1 to α3
TAit is the total accruals for firm i in period t, which has been calculated using
the difference between actual earnings (AE) and cash flow from operations (CFO):
TAit = AEit − C FOit .
ΔSALEit is the change in sales for firm i in period t compared with t-1.
ΔRECit is the change in receivables for firm i in period t compared with t-1.
PPEit is property, plant and equipment for firm i in period t.
Ait−1 is the total assets figure for firm i in period t-1 and we have used it as a deflator
to prevent heteroscedasticity problems
Data are extracted from DATASTREAM
The firms that met their earnings forecasts may (or not)
have perceived an incentive to manage earnings in order
5The concepts of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals are ex-
plained by Dechow et al. (2010), Francis et al. (2004) and Kothari et al.
(2005), among others.
6Different models have been used in the literature to estimate non-
discretionary accruals. A comprehensive overview of these models is presen-
ted by Callao et al. (2014).
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to meet these forecasts. Consequently, the value of ITVE
is 1 for firms who meet earnings forecasts when their non-
discretionary earnings (N DE) are below the earnings fore-
cast (EF) and their discretionary accruals (DA) are positive
(N DE < EF and DA> 0) That is, this value is assigned when
firms have an incentive to manage earnings upwards to reach
forecasts and do so. The value of ITVE is 0 for firms who
meet earnings forecasts when their non-discretionary earn-
ings are above the earnings forecast (N DE > EF). In these
cases, firms lack an incentive to manage earnings upwards
to meet earnings forecasts (note that earnings may be man-
aged, but the incentive for doing so is not to meet earnings
forecasts). The process used to assign values of 1 or 0 to ITVE
is explained in Annex 1.
Explanatory variable (mean|CAR|): As indicated above,
this variable is defined as the mean of the absolute values
of the cumulative abnormal return of the shares listed in a
certain market in a ± 1 window around earnings announce-
ment date, which is when we know whether companies met
their earnings forecasts. We introduce the reward (or pen-
alty) with a delay period, because the manager’s incentive to
meet analysts’ forecasts will depend on the reaction of the
market in the past (t−1). The variable is calculated for each
studied year according to the process explained in Annex 2.
The statistical significance of the mean
CARjt−1 variable
indicates that the cumulative abnormal return around the
earnings announcement date, as a measure of the reward
(or penalty) the firm receives for meeting (or failing to meet)
earnings forecasts, is related to a firm’s motivation to man-
age its earnings to meet these forecasts. The expected coef-
ficient sign is positive since the greater the reward (penalty)
for meeting (failing to meet) forecasts, the more likely the
firm will perceive an incentive to manage earnings.
Control variables: We introduce seven control variables
in the model:
• Economic-financial ratios measuring the liquidity (LIQ),
solvency (SOLV ), indebtedness (DEBT) and return on in-
vestment (ROI) of the firms: Since the economic and finan-
cial position of firms influences their earnings management
(Bikky & Picheng, 2002; Charitou et al., 2012; DeFond &
Jiambalvo, 1994; Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009; Rosner, 2003;
Sweeney, 1994), we expect that a worse economic and fin-
ancial situation (lower liquidity, solvency and profitability
and higher indebtedness) will be associated with greater
incentives to manage earnings. So, the expected sign for
LIQ, SOLV and ROI is negative and that for DEBT is pos-
itive.
• Firm size (SI Z E): Many prior studies have analysed the
relationship between firm size and earnings management,
proposing diverse conclusions (e.g. Barton & Simko, 2002;
Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Kim et al., 2003; Llukani,
2013; Swastika, 2013). In our case, we have to consider
that larger companies are more visible in the market and
are usually followed by more analysts. This may increase
companies’ fear of not meeting forecasts and thus increase
the probability that they will manage earnings. Hence, the
expected sign is positive.
• Variation of GDP (varGDP): Through this variable, we
control for the effect of changes in economic situation on
the incentive to manage earnings. We expect to find a neg-
ative relationship, indicating that good evolution of GDP
may limit the incentive to manage earnings (Chih, Shen, &
Kang, 2007, and Shen & Chih, 2005, point out that those
richer countries are generally less likely to manage earn-
ings).
• Market liquidity (rotMKT): This variable represents the
degree of ease or difficulty of finding a counterpart, buyer
or seller for a share. Ascioglu, Hegde, Krishnan, and Mc-
Dermott (2012) suggest that firms exhibiting greater earn-
ings management are associated with lower market liquid-
ity. However, Huang, Lao, and McPhee (2017) show that
stock liquidity increases accrual-based earnings manage-
ment. Thus, we cannot predict the sign of the relationship
between rotMKT and the incentive to manage earnings.
The descriptive statistics for the variables in regression (2)
are presented in Table 5, and the correlations between these
variables are shown in Table 6. As can be seen, the correla-
tions between the variables are low or moderate and the signs
of the correlations are as expected. The negative sign of the
correlation between mean |CAR| and varGDP may be surpris-
ing. This indicates that when the economy gets worse, the re-
ward (penalty) for companies that meet (fail to meet) their
earnings forecasts is higher. Investors think that when the
economy is improving, companies are able to meet earnings
forecasts more easily. We must consider that CAR is meas-
ured in a ± 1 window around the earnings announcement.
Thus, CAR does not measure the evolution of stock prices,
but the reaction to a particular event within a short period.
The negative relationship between varGDP and rotMKT
may also draw attention apriori, but this is not surprising
if we consider that rotMKT is the quotient between trade
volume and market capitalisation. In rising periods, both
trade volume and capitalisation can increase, but if capital-
isation increases proportionally more than trade volume (be-
cause, for example, investments are more stable), the quo-
tient will decrease. In the other hand, in rising periods not
always the volume trade increases because sometimes the in-
vestments are more stable.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for variables in equation 2
│ │
LIQit is the liquidity ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between t
assets and current liabilities (data from DATASTREAM). 
SOLVit is the solvency ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient betwee
assets and total liabilities (data from DATASTREAM). 
DEBTit is the debt ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between the liab
equity (data from DATASTREAM). 
ROIit is the return-on-investment for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient be
operating profits and total assets (data from DATASTREAM). 
SIZEit measures the size of firm i in period t, and we define it using the asset logarithm (
DATASTREAM). 
varGDPjt is the percentage variation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between year t and
country in which market j is located (data from Worl Bank) 
rotMKTjt is a proxy of the liquidity of market j in period t, which is defined as the quotient be
trade volume and the market capitalization at the end of year t (data from DATASTREAM).
mean
CARjt−1 is the explanatory variable quantifying the average reward (or pen-
alty) in market j in period t-1 for meeting (or failing) to meet earnings forecasts. It
is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal return in a
-1+1 window around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in index j in
period t-1. See computation in Annex 2.
LIQit is the liquidity ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
between the current assets and current liabilities (data from DATASTREAM).
SOLVit is the solvency ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
between the total assets and total liabilities (data from DATASTREAM).
DEBTit is the debt ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between
the liabilities and equity (data from DATASTREAM).
ROIit is the return-on-investment for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
between the operating profits and total assets (data from DATASTREAM).
SI Z Eit measures the size of firm i in period t, and we define it using the asset logarithm
(data from DATASTREAM).
varGDPjt is the percentage variation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between year
t and t-1 in the country in which market j is located (data from Worl Bank)
rotMKTjt is a proxy of the liquidity of market j in period t, which is defined as the
quotient between the trade volume and the market capitalization at the end of year
t (data from DATASTREAM).
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Table 6
Pearson Correlations (variables in equation 2)
│ │
 
∗ Significant at 0.05∗∗ Significant at 0.01
mean
CARjt−1 is the explanatory variable quantifying the average reward (or pen-
alty) in market j in period t-1 for meeting (or failing) to meet earnings forecasts. It
is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal return in a
-1+1 window around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in index j in
period t-1. See computation in Annex 2.
LIQit is the liquidity ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
between the current assets and current liabilities (data from DATASTREAM).
SOLVit is the solvency ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
between the total assets and total liabilities (data from DATASTREAM).
DEBTit is the debt ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between
the liabilities and equity (data from DATASTREAM).
ROIit is the return-on-investment for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
between the operating profits and total assets (data from DATASTREAM).
SI Z Eit measures the size of firm i in period t, and we define it using the asset logarithm
(data from DATASTREAM).
varGDPjt is the percentage variation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between year
t and t-1 in the country in which market j is located (data from World Bank)
rotMKTit is a proxy of the liquidity of market j in period t, which is defined as the
quotient between the trade volume and the market capitalization at the end of year
t (data from DATASTREAM).
5. Results
This paper investigates whether the reward (penalty) for
meeting (failing to meet) analysts’ forecasts differs between
markets (H1) and whether the market’s reaction influences
the incentive for companies to manage earnings to meet fore-
casts (H2).
We find significant differences in the reward (penalty) for
meeting (failing to meet) earnings forecasts between the mar-
kets. The results of the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test of
k independent samples (Table 7) highlight significant differ-
ences in mean |CAR| across the six indices we analysed. In
other words, we can confirm that the reaction of share prices
to meeting (or failing to meet) an earnings forecast is signific-
antly different at the 1% level. Previous studies have already
investigated the market’s reaction when it is known whether
companies reached their earnings forecasts or not (Bartov et
al., 2002; Edmonds et al., 2018; Kasznik & McNichols, 2002;
Kinney et al., 2002; López & Rees, 2002; Skinner & Sloan,
2002). However, these studies focused only on one market,
most often the US market, so we cannot compare our results
with theirs. However, we can affirm that the results coincide
with our expectations, since changes in share prices, which
determine CAR, depend on many factors that differ between
the markets we study.
The ranks generated by the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 8)
show that meeting (or failing to meet) forecasts has the most
impact on CAR in the British market, followed by the Ger-
man, American, Brazilian, Spanish and Hong Kong markets.
In other words, the reaction of share prices to earnings an-
nouncements, which provide information about whether ana-
lysts’ forecasts were met or not, is strongest in the British and
German markets and weakest in the Spanish and Hong Kong
markets. Furthermore, the results of the Mann-Whitney test,
which was conducted to compare the reaction for each pair





mean |CAR| is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal re-
turn in a -1+1 window around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in the
indexes under study. It measures the reward (or penalty) for meeting (or failing) to
meet earnings forecasts. See computation in Annex 2.
Table 8
Kruskal-Wallis test ranksTable 8. Kruskal-Wallis test ranks 
INDEX N Average rank 
BOVESPA 440 646.83 
mean | CAR | DAX 240 1330.06 
DOW JONES 250 626.78 
FTSE 770 1602.44 
HANG-SENG 280 470.50 
IBEX 260 511.17 
Total 2,240 
mean CAR is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal return in a 
around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in the indexes under study. It measur
(or penalty) for meeting (or failing) to meet earnings forecasts. See computation in Annex 2. 
mean |CAR| is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal re-
turn in a -1+1 window around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in the
indexes under study. It measures the reward (or penalty) for meeting (or failing) to
meet earnings forecasts. See computation in Annex 2.
Table 9
Mann-Whitney test results
Table 9: Mann-Whitney test results 
mean | CAR | DAX DOW JONES FTSE HANG SENG IBEX 
Mann-Whitney U 0.000 35200 0.000 34496 34320 BOVESA 
Wilcoxon W 78606 60625 78606 66374 61815 
Z -20.500 -4.359 -27.535 -6.641 -5.452
Asymptotic sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mann-Whitney U 4800 34416 0.000 1872 DAX 
Wilcoxon W 30225 54852 31878 29367 
Z -14.597 -12.926 -18.689 -17.004
Asymptotic sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mann-Whitney U 15400 23800 25350 DOW 
JONES Wilcoxon W 40825 55678 52845 
Z -18.155 -3.032 -0.687
Asymptotic sig. 0.000 0.002 0.492 
Mann-Whitney U 0.000 0.000 FTSE 
Wilcoxon W 31878 27495 
Z -23.594 -22.958
Asymptotic sig. 0.000 0.000 
Mann-Whitney U 283920 HANG 
SENG Wilcoxon W 60270 
Z -0.707
Asymptotic sig. 0.480
mean CAR is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal return in a -1+1 wind
around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in the indexes under study. It measures the rew
(or penalty) for meeting (or failing) to meet earnings forecasts. See computation in Annex 2. 
mean |CAR| is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal re-
turn in a -1+1 window around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in the
indexes under study. It measures the reward (or penalty) for meeting (or failing) to
meet earnings forecasts. See computation in Annex 2.
reacts in a significantly different way to the other markets.
To identify which characteristics of the markets and coun-
tries may explain differences in market reactions, we per-
formed regression (1). The results are shown in Table 10.
The table shows that all the variables are significant at the
1% level, except ACC , which is significant at 10%. The pos-
itive sign of the coefficient of LEG indicates that the reac-
tion of a company’s share prices to meeting or failing to meet
an earnings forecast is higher in stock markets in countries
with a Roman Germanic legal tradition (i.e. a code law sys-
tem). The fact that these countries have less of a stock market
tradition than those based on Anglo-Saxon legal traditions
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Table 10
Linear regression results (equation 1)
mean
CARjt = α0 +α1 LEGj +α2 F IN DEVj +α3AFOLLit +α4ACCit +α5 lGDPjt + eit
Table 10. Linear regression results (equation 1) 
mean CARjt  = α0 + α1LEGj + α2FINDEVj + α3AFOLLit + α4ACCj+ α5lGDPjt + +eit 
B Standard error Sig. 
LEG 0.014 0.001 0.000 
FINDEV -0.020 0.002 0.000 
AFOLL 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ACC -0.369 0.011 0.084 
lGDP -0.133 0.010 0.000 
Constant 0.679 0.046 0.419 
an CARjt  is the dependent variable and quantifying the average reward (or penalty) in 
rket j in period t for meeting (or failing) to meet earnings forecasts. It is defined as the mean 
he absolute values of cumulative abnormal return in a -1+1 window around the earnings 
ouncement date for firms listed in index j in period t. See computation in Annex 2. 
Gj is a dichotomous variable representing the legal system of country j, taking value 0 for 
mmon law and value 1 for code law, according to the classification by Djankov et al. (2007). 
NDEVj measures the level of financial development for country j by the variable Finance-
gregate taken from Beck and Levine, (2002). 
OLLit is the number of analysts following the company i in period t (data extracted from 
/E/S). 
Cit is the absolute difference between actual earnings and earnings forecast scaled by 
nings forecast for company i in period t (actual data extracted from DATASTREAM and 
ecasted data extracted from I/B/E/S). 
DPjt is the logarithm of GDP per capita for country j in period t (data from Word Bank) 
mean
CARjt  is the dependent variable and quantifying the average reward (or pen-
alty) in market j in period t for meeting (or failing) to meet earnings forecasts. It
is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal return in a
-1+1 window around the earnings announceme t date for firms listed in index j in
period t. See computation in Annex 2.
LEGj is a dichotomous variable representing the legal system of country j, taking
value 0 for common law and value 1 for code law, according to the classification
by Djankov et al. (2007).
F IN DEVj measures the level of financial development for country j by the variable
Finance-Aggregate taken from Beck and Levine, (2002).
AFOLLit is the number of analysts following the company i in period t (data extracted
from I/B/E/S).
ACCit is the absolute difference between actual earnings and earnings forecast scaled
by earnings forecast for company i in period t (actual data extracted from DATA-
STREAM and forecasted data extracted from I/B/E/S).
lGDPjt is the logarithm of GDP per capit for country j in period ( ata from Word
Bank)
(i.e. those with a common law system) may explain this re-
lationship. Analysts’ forecasts can be considered a more rel-
evant source of information in countries with a code law sys-
tem, where there are not as many sophisticated analytical
elements as in more developed markets. Thus, the market
will have a stronger reaction to meeting or failing to meet
earnings forecasts will be stronger.
As expected, there is a negative relationship between
F IN DEV and the market’s reaction. The higher level of in-
formation available in more developed markets means that
analysts’ forecasts are not as important for investors’ decision-
making. For this reason, the impact of meeting earnings fore-
casts on the cumulative abnormal return of shares will not be
as significant as in the markets with less availability of inform-
ation.
AFOLL has a positive relationship with the dependent vari-
able. A greater number of analysts following a company im-
plies that the company is more visible to the market. This
leads investors to have a greater reaction to companies that
meet or fail to meet earnings forecasts.
As expected, the coefficient of ACC is negative. In mar-
kets in which forecasts are more accurate and there is lower
earnings deviation from forecasts (i.e. lower ACC values), in-
vestors are accustomed to companies meeting earnings fore-
casts. Failure to meet these forecasts will be received with
surprise by these markets, and they will react more strongly
than markets more accustomed to less accurate earnings fore-
casts.
Finally, the market reaction is greater in countries with
lower GDP per capita, as investors have fewer available re-
sources to make investments and the lower return on their
investments has a greater impact on their wealth. Thus, meet-
ing (failing to meet) earnings forecasts, which is considered
positive (negative) news by investors, will generate a greater
reward (penalty) within the market.
After establishing that there are significant differences in
the way markets behave, we focused on assessing whether
the impact of meeting (or failing to meet) forecasts influences
firms’ perceived incentive to meet their forecasts through
earnings management.
We conducted a logistic regression (equation 2) for that
purpose, the results of which are shown in Table 11. The
model correctly classified 61.7% of cases.
Table 11
Logistic regression results (equation 2)
I T V Eit = α0 +α1mean
CARjt−1+α2 LIQit +α3SOLVit +α4 DEBTit +α5ROIit
+α6SI Z Eit +α7 varGDPjt +α8 rotMKTjt + eit
Table 11. Logistic regression results (equation 2) 
ITVEit = α0 + α1mean CARjt-1  + α2LIQit + α3SOLVit + α4DEBTit  α5ROIit  α6SIZEit + α7varGD
α8rotMKTjt +eit 
B Standard error    Wald      df Sig. 
 
mean | CARt-1 | 47.868 19.345 6.123 1 0.013 
LIQ 0.072 0.158 0.209 1 0.648 
SOLV 0.113 0.195 0.333 1 0.564 
DEBT -0.121 0.075 2.574 1 0.109 
ROI 3.118 1.546 4.064 1 0.044 
SIZE 0.015 0.171 0.008 1 0.930 
varGDP -0.054 0.026 4.195 1 0.041 
rotMKT -0.008 0.004 3.088 1 0.079 
Constant -1.146 1.430 0.642 1 0.423 
ITVEit is the dependent variable representing the incentive of firm i in period t to manage ear
upward to meet analysts’ forecasts. Its value will be 1 for firms with the incentive to manage ear
and 0 otherwise. See computation in Annex 2. 
mean CARjt-1  is the explanatory variable quantifying the average reward (or penalty) in mark
period t-1 for meeting (or failing) to meet earnings forecasts. It is defined as the mean of the ab
values of cumulative abnormal return in a -1+1 window around the earnings announcement da
firms listed in index j in period t-1. See computation in Annex 2. 
LIQit is the liquidity ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between the cu
assets and current liabilities (data from DATASTREAM). 
SOLVit is the solvency ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between the
assets and total liabilities (data from DATASTREAM). 
DEBTit is the debt ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between the liab
nd equity (data from DATASTREAM). 
ROIit is the return-on-investment for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient betwee
perating profits and total assets (data from DATASTREAM). 
SIZEit measures the size of firm i in period t, and we define it using the asset logarithm (data
DATASTREAM). 
varGDPjt is the percentage variation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between year t and t-1 
country in which market j is located (data from World Bank). 
rotMKTjt is a proxy of the liquidity of market j in period t, which is defined as the quotient be
the trade volume and the market capitalization at the end of year t (data from DATASTREAM).
I T V Eit is the dependent variable representing the incentive of firm i in period t to
manage earnings upward to meet analysts forecasts. Its value will be 1 for firms
with the incentive to manage earnings and 0 otherwise. See computation in Annex
2.
mean
CARjt−1 is the explanatory variable quantifying the average reward (or pen-
al y) in market j in period t-1 for meeting (or failing) to meet earning for casts. It
is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal return in a
-1+1 window around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in index j in
period t-1. See computation in Annex 2.
LIQit is the liquidity ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
between h current assets and current liabilities (data from DATASTREAM).
SOLVit is the solvency ratio for firm i in period t, which w define as the quotient
between the total assets and total liabilities (data from DATASTREAM).
DEBTit is the debt ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between
the liabilities and equity (data from DATASTREAM).
ROIit is the return-on-investment for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
betwee the op rating profits and total assets (data from DATASTREAM).
SI Z Eit measure the size of firm i in period t, and we define it using the asset logarithm
(data from DATASTREAM).
varGDPjt is the percentage variation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between year
t and t-1 in the country in which market j is located (data from World Bank).
rotMKTjt is a proxy of the liquidity of market j in period t, which is defined as the
quotient between the trade volume and the market capitalization at the end of year
t (data from DATASTREAM).
The relevant variable for the proposed objective is
mean |CAR|. As we can observe, it is significant at the 5%
level; in other words, the impact of meeting earnings fore-
casts on the cumulative abnormal return of shares explains
firms’ incentive to manage earnings to meet analysts’ fore-
casts. As mentioned above, previous studies (Bartov et al.,
2002; Edmonds et al., 2018; Skinner & Sloan, 2002) have
examined the positive (negative) market reaction when com-
panies meet (fail to meet) earnings forecasts (i.e. the CAR
around an earnings announcement). Likewise, previous stud-
ies (e.g. Callao & Jarne, 2018; Dechow et al., 2000; Mat-
sumoto, 2002; Payne & Robb, 2000) have proven that there
is a relationship between earnings management and earnings
forecasts, and other investigations (Caneghem, 2002; García
Osma et al., 2005; Niskanen & Keloharju, 2000) identified
analysts’ forecasts as possible incentives for earnings man-
agement.
The present paper provides evidence that the relationship
between earnings management and meeting earnings fore-
casts (ITVE) depends on the magnitude of the market reac-
tion when companies meet (or fail to meet) earnings fore-
casts (CAR around earnings announcements). Since we find
significant differences in the magnitude of the market reac-
tion, the results suggest that the incentive to manage earn-
ings in order to meet forecasts depends on the market in
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which a company is listed.
The positive variable coefficient means that the larger the
market’s reward (penalty) for meeting (failing to meet) ana-
lysts’ forecasts, the more likely it is that companies will per-
ceive an incentive to manage earnings. This is the case for
firms listed in the FTSE and DAX indexes. The firms listed in
the Hang Seng and IBEX indexes are those that perceive this
incentive to be least strong.
ROI is the only financial variable that is significant (at the
5% level). This suggests that analysts are more demanding
with the most profitable companies when they forecast their
earnings and therefore these firms are more likely to manip-
ulate their accounting figures to attain these high-return tar-
gets. The other financial ratios are not significant, which
means that the company’s financial position is not very rel-
evant to earnings management performed to meet earnings
forecasts, unlike when companies manage earnings for other
reasons.
Two other control variables are significant: varGDP (at the
5% level) and rotMKT (at the 10% level). Our expectation for
varGDP, which was based on the work of Chih et al. (2007)
and Shen and Chih (2005), was met. The negative coeffi-
cient indicates that the more the GDP decreases and the eco-
nomy worsens, the greater the likelihood that companies will
perceive an incentive to manage earnings in order to meet
forecasts. A negative coefficient was also found for rotMKT,
which indicates that when the market is more liquid, there is
a lower probability that companies will perceive an incentive
to manage earnings. Since some studies suggest a positive re-
lationship in this regard and others suggest the opposite, we
did not predicted the sign of the coefficient. However, our
results align with those of Ascioglu et al. (2012).
6. Sensitivity analysis
The results of our study could be biased by the model used
to obtain DA, the value of which was used to determine the
value of the dependent variable, ITVE, in regression (2). For
this reason, we carried out a sensitivity analysis, repeating
our study using Larcker and Richardson’s (2004) model and


















TAit represents the total accruals for firm *i* in period *t*,
which were calculated based on the difference between ac-
tual earnings (AE) and cash flow from operations (CFO):
*TA it = *AE* it * - CFO* it *.
ΔSALEit represents the change in sales for firm *i* in period
*t* compared to *t*-1.
ΔRECit represents the change in receivables for firm *i* in
period *t* compared to *t*-1.
PPEit represents the property, plants and equipment of firm
*i* in period *t*.
BtMit represents the book to market ratio for firm *i* in
period *t*.
C FOit represents the cash flow from operations for firm *i*
in period *t*.
Ait−1 represents the total assets of firm *i* in period *t*-1,
which we used as a deflator to prevent heteroscedasticity
problems.
eit is the error term for firm *i* in period *t*.
For this regression, data were extracted from Datastream.
After estimating the parameters for equation (3), we used
these values to predict the total accruals during the period of


















where DAit represents the discretionary accruals for firm i
in period t and a1, a2, a3, a4 and a5 are the estimated values
of parameters α1 −α5.
The descriptive statistics for DA, which were estimated
based on Larcker and Richardson’s (2004) model, are presen-
ted in Table 12.
Table 12





























Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation 
DA (BOVESPA) -0.1457 0.0138 0.0011 0.0451 
DA (DAX) -0.0853 0.0853 0.0005 0.0262 
DA (DOW JONES) -0.0632 0.0581 0.0011 0.0187 
DA (FTSE) -0.1058 0.1009 0.0003 0.0309 
DA (HANG SENG) -0.0978 0.1158 -0.0021 0.0334 
DA (IBEX) -0.0852 0.0788 -0.0003 0.0246 
DA (INDEX): Discretionary accruals obtained from the estimation of Larcker and Richardson 











DAit is the discretionary accruals for firm i in period t  
a1, a2, a3, a4 and a5 are the estimated values of parameters α1 to α5. 
TAit is the total accruals for firm i in period t, which has been calculated using the di
between actual earnings (AE) and cash flow from operations (CFO): TAit = AEit - CFOit
∆SALEit is the change in sales for firm i in period t compared with t-1. 
∆RECit is the change in receivables for firm i in period t compared with t-1. 
PPEit is property, plant and equipment for firm i in period t. 
BtMit is the book to market ratio for firm i in period t. 
CFOit is the cash flow from operations for firm i in period t. 
Ait-1 is the total assets figure for firm i in period t-1 and we have used it as a deflator to
heteroscedasticity problems.  
Data were extracted from DATASTREAM. 
DA (INDEX): Discretionary accruals obtained from the estimation of Larcker and





















DAit is the discretionary accruals for firm i in period t
a1, a2, a3, a4 and a5 are the estimated values of parameters α1 to α5.
TAit is the total accruals for firm i in period t, which has been calculated using the
difference between actual earnings (AE) and cash flow from operations (CFO):
TAit = AEit − C FOit .
SALEit is the change in sales or firm i in period t compared with t-1.
RECit is the change i receivables for firm i in pe i d t compared with t-1.
PPEit is property, plant and equipment for firm i in peri d t.
BtMit is the book to mark t r tio for fi m i in period t.
C FOit is the cash flow from operations for firm i in period t.
Taking into account the definition of ITVE, we allocated val-
ues of 1 and 0 depending on the estimations obtained with
Larcker and Richardson’s (2004) model. A value of 1 was
assigned to firms for which NDEit < EFit and DAit > 0, and
a value of 0 was assigned otherwise. Using the new values
of ITVE variable (ITVEit) obtained with Larcker and Richard-
son’s (2004) model, we performed regression (2) again and
obtained the results presented in Table 13.
As shown in the table, the results are not very different
from those presented in Section 5, although the model cor-
rectly classifies only 59.5% of the cases, which is lower than
the 61.7% correctly identified using the other model. As
above, the explanatory variable, mean |CAR|, was significant
at the 5% level and the coefficient had the expected sign.
With respect to the control variables, ROI and varGDP were
significant at the 10% level and had positive and negative
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signs, respectively. These results can be interpreted in the
same way as those presented in Section 5. However, the li-
quidity of the market was insignificant.
Table 13
Logistic regression results (equation 2; Larcker & Richardson, 2004)
I T V Eit (Larcker & Richardson)= α0 +α1mean
CARjt−1+α2 LIQit +α3SOLVit
+α4 DEBTit +α5ROIit +α6SI Z Eit +α7 varGDPt +α8 rotMKTjt + eit
Table 13. Logistic regression results (equation 2; Larcher & Richardson, 2004) 
Larcker & Richardson)= α0 + α1mean CARjt-1  + α2LIQit + α3SOLVit + α4DEBTit + α5ROIit + α6SIZEit 
+ α7varGDPt + α8rotMKTjt +eit 
B Standard error Wald df Sig. 
,
2
Mean | CARt-1 | 46.532 19.258 5.838 1 0.016 
LIQ 0.058 0.157 0.136 1 0.712 
SOLV 0.125 0.195 0.412 1 0.521 
DEBT -0.096 0.073 1.726 1 0.189 
ROI 2.945 1.541 3.653 1 0.056 
SIZE 0.002 0.170 0.000 1 0.991 
varGDP -0.046 0.026 3.092 1 0.079 
rotMKT -0.006 0.004 1.642 1 0.200 
Constant -1.151 1.424 0.654 1 0.419 
Eit (Larcker & Richardson) is the dependent variable representing the incentive of firm i in period 
manage earnings upward to meet analysts’ forecasts. Its value will be 1 for firms with the incentive 
anage earnings and 0 otherwise. The allocation of these values is based on discretionary accruals 
mated with Larcker -+& Richardson (2004) model. 
n CARjt-1  is the explanatory variable quantifying the average reward (or penalty) in market j in 
d t-1 for meeting (or failing) to meet earnings forecasts. It is defined as the mean of the absolute 
es of cumulative abnormal return in a -1+1 window around the earnings announcement date for 
listed in index j in period t-1. 
is the liquidity ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between the current 
s and current liabilities (data from DATASTREAM). 
Vit is the solvency ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between the total 
s and total liabilities (data from DATASTREAM). 
Tit is the debt ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between the liabilities 
equity (data from DATASTREAM). 
is the return-on-investment for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between the 
ating profits and total assets (data from DATASTREAM). 
it measures the size of firm i in period t, and we define it using the asset logarithm (data from 
ASTREAM). 
GDPjt is the percentage variation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between year t and t-1 in the 
try in which market j is located (data from World Bank).
MKTjt is a proxy of the liquidity of market j in period t, which is defined as the quotient between 
rade volume and the market capitalization at the end of year t (data from DATASTREAM). 
I T V Eit (Larcker & Richardson) is the dependent variable representing the incentive
of firm i in period t to manage earnings upward to meet analysts forecasts. Its value
will be 1 for firms with the incentive to manage earnings and 0 otherwise. The
allocation of these values is b sed on discretionary accruals estimated with Larcker
and Richardson (2004) model.
mean
CARjt−1 is the explanatory variable quantifying the average reward (or pen-
alty) in market j in period t-1 for meeting (or failing) to meet earnings forecasts. It
is defined as the mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal return in a
-1+1 window around the earnings announcement date for firms listed in index j in
period t-1.
LIQit is the liquidity ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
between the current assets and current liabilities ( ata from DATASTREAM).
SOLVit is the solvency ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
between the total assets and total liabilities (data from DATASTREAM).
DEBTit is the debt ratio for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient between
the liabilities and equity (data from DATASTREAM).
ROIit is the return-on-investment for firm i in period t, which we define as the quotient
between the operating profits and total assets (data from DATASTREAM).
SI Z Eit measures the size of firm i in period t, and we define it using the asset logarithm
(data from DATASTREAM).
varGDPt is the percentage variation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between year
t and t-1 in the country in which m rket j is located (da a from World Bank).
rotMKTjt is a proxy of the liquidity of market j in period t, which is defined as the
quotient between the trade volume and the market capitalization at the end of year
t (data from DATASTREAM).
7. Conclusions
The purpose of the study was to understand (1) whether
the market’s reward (penalty) for meeting (failing to meet)
analysts’ forecasts significantly differs between markets and
(2) whether the magnitude of that reward (penalty) influ-
ences the perceived incentive to manage earnings in order to
meet forecasts.
Based on a sample of firms listed in six different stock
indexes, we find significant differences between markets in
terms of their reaction to companies meeting (or failing to
meet) earnings forecasts. These differences in stock returns
are explained by various features of the markets and the coun-
tries in which they are located. Our results show that markets
in countries with code law systems, less financial and eco-
nomic development, more analysts following companies and
more accurate forecasts generate the strongest reactions. In
each market analysed in the study, we can observe features
that stimulate greater reactions and those that could limit
reactions. The order of the indexes from most to least re-
ward (penalty) for companies that meet (fail to meet) earn-
ings forecasts depends on a set of variables with effects in
opposite directions.
In addition, the results show a positive link between the
market’s reward (penalty) for stocks that meet (fail to meet)
earnings forecasts and the perceived incentive to manage
earnings to meet forecasts. The larger the reward or pen-
alty, the more likely firms are to feel motivated to manage
their earnings to meet earnings forecasts.
These results do not imply that companies listed in markets
with lower rewards or penalties necessarily perceive less in-
centive to manage earnings, since perceived incentive may
be related to diverse goals. However, our results do indicate
that the perceived incentive to manage earnings to meet ana-
lysts’ forecasts, which was examined in numerous prior stud-
ies (Callao & Jarne, 2018; Dechow et al., 2000; Matsumoto,
2002; Payne & Robb, 2000; Zhang et al., 2018), is stronger
in markets in which meeting forecasts is more valued.
Our results are especially relevant for investors, regulators,
auditors and analysts. When deciding to invest or divest in
markets with a greater reaction to meeting or failing to meet
analysts’ forecasts, investors should consider that companies
who met these forecasts may have done so at least partially
through earnings management, not necessarily good busi-
ness management. Additionally, in light of our findings, reg-
ulatory bodies should strive to ensure compliance with reg-
ulations and auditors should improve their supervision over
firms to limit and detect these management practices, partic-
ularly for firms listed in markets in which there is a greater
perceived incentive for earnings management. Finally, ana-
lysts should be aware of the importance of their forecasts.
In many cases, these forecasts become goals to reach, which
could encourage earnings management, especially in mar-
kets with certain features. In addition, manipulation of re-
ports by analysts may play an important role in influencing
companies’ behaviour, as emphasised by Ciesielski and Henry
(2017).
This research builds upon prior international literature.
First, it contributes to the field of event studies by provid-
ing an international comparison of the reactions of different
markets to companies that meet or fail to meet earnings fore-
casts, a topic that has not yet been covered. Second, this
study builds upon prior studies of earnings management in-
centives and analysts’ forecasts. It proves that the way these
forecasts affect firms’ motivation to adopt earnings manage-
ment practices varies across markets based on their reaction
to companies who meet or fail to meet earnings forecasts.
Our study has some limitations arising from the inherent
qualities of this type of research. The first is the use of discre-
tionary accruals as a way to measure earnings management,
as this means that our results are affected by the model we
chose to estimate these accruals. Lack of precision and im-
proper specification of accrual models can result in measure-
ment errors. However, our sensitivity analysis shows similar
results when a different model was used. Second, this type
of study suffers from endogenous problems7, which we tried
to mitigate by incorporating control variables into the regres-
sion.
Future research in this area could analyse forecasted ac-
counting figures other than earnings, since market reactions
can be affected by these figures as well.
Funding
This study was financed by the Regional Government
of Aragón in the framework of the Research Group Ref.
S33_17R.
7For more on this issue, see studies like those of Larcker and Rusticus
(2010) and Lennox et al. (2012).
S. Callao Gastón, J.I. Jarne Jarne / Revista de Contabilidad Spanish Accounting Review 24 (1)(2021) 75-89 85
Conflict of interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Abarbanell, J., & Lehavy, R. (2003a). Biased forecasts or
biased earnings? The role of reported earnings in explaining
apparent bias and over/under reaction in analystst’ earnings
forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36, 105-146.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.11.001
Abarbanell, J., & Lehavy, R. (2003b). Can stock recom-
mendations predict earnings management and analysts’ earn-
ings forecast errors? Journal of Accounting Research, 41 (1),
1-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.00093
Ascioglu, A., Hegde, S., Krishnan, G., & McDermott, J.
(2012). Earnings management and market liquidity. Re-
view of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 38, 257-274.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-010-0225-9
Barton, J., & Simko, P. (2002). The balance sheet as an
earnings management constraint. The Accounting Review, 77,
1–27. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.1
Bartov, E., Givoly, D., & Hayn, C. (2002). The rewards to
meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, 33, 173-204. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S0165-4101(02)00045-9
Barua, A., Hoon, J., & Yi, S. (2019). Hierarchy of earnings
thresholds based on discretionary accruals. Advances in Ac-
counting, 44, 29-48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2018.
12.002
Beck, T., & Levine, R., (2002). Industry growth and cap-
ital allocation: does having a market- or bank-based sys-
tem matter? Journal of Financial Economics, 64, 147–180.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00074-0
Bikky, J., & Picheng, L. (2002). Earnings management in
response to debt covenant violations and debt restructuring.
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 17 (4), 295-324.
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0148558X0201700402
Brown, L. (2003). Small negative surprises: frequency and
consequence. International Journal of Forecasting, 19, 149-
159. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-2070(02)00061-4
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings Manage-
ment to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses. Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 24, 99-126. https://doi.org/10.
1016/S0165-4101(97)00017-7
Burgstahler, D., & Eames, M. (2006). Management of
earnings and analystst’ forecasts to achieve zero and small
positive earnings surprises. Journal of Business, Finance and
Accounting, 33 (5&6), 633-652. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1468-5957.2006.00630.x
Callao, S., Jarne, J.I., & Wroblewski (2014). The develop-
ment of earnings management research. Review of literature
from three different perspectives. Theoretical Journal of Ac-
counting, 79 (135), 135-177.
Callao, S., & Jarne, J.I. (2018). Los pronósticos de los an-
alistas como incentivo a la manipulación del resultado. Span-
ish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de
Financiación y Contabilidad, 47 (1), 124-155. https://doi.
org/10.1080/02102412.2017.1371977
Caneghem, T. (2002). Earnings management induced by
cognitive reference points. British Accounting Review, 34 (2),
167-178. https://doi.org/10.1006/bare.2002.0190
Charitou, M., Lois, P., & Santoso, H. B. (2012). The Rela-
tionship Between Working Capital Management and Firms
Profitability: An Empirical Investigation for an Emerging
Asian Country. International Business & Economics Research
Journal, 11 (8), 839-847. https://doi.org/10.19030/iber.
v11i8.7162
Cheng, Q., & Warfield, T.D. (2005). Equity incentives and
earnings management. The Accounting Review, 80 (2), 441-
476. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2005.80.2.441
Chih, H., Shen, C., & Kang, F. (2007). Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, Investor Protection, and Earnings Management:
Some International Evidence. Journal of Business Ethics, 79,
179–198. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9383-7
Ciesielski, J., & Henry, E. (2017). Accountingt’s tower of
Babel: key considerations in assessing non-GAAP earnings.
Financial Analysts Journal, 73 (2), 34-50. https://doi.org/
10.2469/faj.v73.n2.5
Das, S., & Zhang, H. (2003). Rounding-up in reported EPS,
behavioural thresholds and earnings management. Journal
of Accounting and Economics, 35 (1), 31-50. https://doi.org/
10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00096-4
Dechow, P., Sloan, R., & Sweeney, A. (1995). Detecting
Earnings Management. The Accounting Review, 70 (2), 193-
225. https://www.jstor.org/stable/248303
Dechow, P., Richardson, S., & Tuna, A. (2000). Are bench-
mark beaters doing anything wrong?. Available in SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=222552 or http://dx.doi.org/10.
2139/ssrn.222552
Dechow, P., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. (2010). Understanding
earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants
and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Econom-
ics, 50 (2&3), 344–401. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.
2010.09.001
Defond, M., & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant vi-
olation and manipulation of accruals, Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, 17, 145-176. https://doi.org/10.1016/
0165-4101(94)90008-6
Degeorge, F., Ding, Y., Jeanjean, T., & Stolowy, H. (2013).
Analyst coverage, earnings management and financial de-
velopment: An international study. Journal of Account-
ing and Public Policy, 32, 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jaccpubpol.2012.10.003
Dichev, I., Graham, J., Harvey, C., & Rajgopal, S. (2016).
The misrepresentation of earnings. Financial Analysts
Journal, 72 (1), 22-35. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v72.n1.
4
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2007). Private
credit in 129 countries. Journal of Finance and Economics, 84,
299-329. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.004
Edmonds, C., Edmonds, J., Fu, R., & Jenkins, D. (2018).
Price momentum and the premium for meeting or beating
analysts’ forecasts of earnings. Advances in Accounting, 42,
34-47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2018.07.003
Embong, Z., & Hossini, L. (2018). Analyst Forecast Accur-
acy and Earnings Management. Asian Journal of Accounting
and Governance, 10, 97–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.17576/
AJAG-2018-10-09
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., & Schipper, K. (2004).
Costs of Equity and Earnings Attributes. The Accounting Re-
view, 79 (4), 967–1010. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2004.
79.4.967
García Osma, B, Gill de Albornoz, B and Gisbert, A.
(2005). La investigación sobre earnings managements. Span-
ish Journal of Finance and Accounting, 34 (127), 1001-1033.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2005.10779570
Huang, K., Lao, B., & McPhee, G. (2017). Does
Stock Liquidity Affect Accrual-based Earnings Management?.
Journal of Business, Finance & Accounting, vol, 44 (3&4), 417-
86 S. Callao Gastón, J.I. Jarne Jarne / Revista de Contabilidad Spanish Accounting Review 24 (1)(2021) 75-89
447. https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12236
Iatridis, G., & Kadorinis, G. (2009). Earnings management
and firm financial motives: A financial investigation of UK
listed firms. International Review of Financial Analysis, 4, 164-
173. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2009.06.001
Kasznik, R., & McNichols, M. (2002). Does meeting ex-
pectations matter?Evidence from analyst forecast revisions
and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research, 40 (3), 727-
759. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.00069
Kim, Y., Liu, C., & Rhee, G. (2003). The Relation of Earn-
ings Management to Firm Size. Working paper, University of
Hawai’i, 1-31.
Kinney, W., Burgstahler, D., & Martin, R. (2002). The
materiality of earnings surprise. Journal of Accounting Re-
search, 40 (5), 1297-1329. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.
170560
Kolmogorov, A. (1933). Sulla determinazione empirica di
una legge di distribuzione. Inst. Ital. Attuari, Giorn., 4, 83-
91.
Kothari, S., Leone, A., & Wasley, C. (2005). Performance
matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, 39 (1), 163–197. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.jacceco.2004.11.002
Kruskal, W. H., & Wallis, W. A. (1952). Use of ranks in
one-criterion variance analysis. Journal of the American Stat-
istical Association, 47 (260), 583-621. https://doi.org/10.
1080/01621459.1952.10483441
Larcker, D., & Richardson, S. (2004). Fees paid to audit
firms, accrual choices, and corporate governance. Journal
of Accounting Research, 42 (3), 625-658. https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1475-679X.2004.t01-1-00143.x
Larcker, D., & Rusticus, T. (2010). On the use of instru-
mental variables in accounting research. Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, 49, 186-205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jacceco.2009.11.004
Larrán, M., & Rees, W. (1999). Propiedades de los pronósti-
cos de beneficios realizados por los analistas financieros: una
aplicación al caso español. Revista Española de Financiación
y Contabilidad, 28 (101), 675-729. https://www.jstor.org/
stable/42782201
Lennox, C., Francis, J., & Wang, Z. (2012). Selection Mod-
els in Accounting Research. The Accounting Review, 87 (2),
589-616. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10195
Llukani, T. (2013). Earnings management and firm size:
an empirical analyze in Albanian market. European Scientific
Journal, 9 (16), 135-143.
López, T. and Rees, L. (2002). The effect of beating
and missing analystst’ forecasts on the information content
of unexpected earnings. Journal of Acccounting, Auditing
and Finance, 17 (2), 155-184. https://doi.org/10.1177%
2F0148558X0201700204
Mann, H. B., & Whitney, D. R. (1947). On a test of whether
one of two random variables is stochastically larger than the
other. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 18, 50-60. https:
//www.jstor.org/stable/2236101
Matsumoto, D.A. (2002). Management’s incentives to
avoid negative earnings surprises. The Accounting Review, 77,
483-514. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.3.483
McNichols, M. (2000). Research design issues in earnings
management studies, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,
19, 313–345. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0278-4254(00)
00018-1
Niskanen, J., & Keloharju, M. (2000). Earnings cosmetics
in tax-driven accounting environment: evidence from Finish
public firms. The European Accounting Review, 9 (3), 443-452.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180020017159
Payne, J., & Robb, S. (2000). Earnings management: the
effect of ex-ante earnings expectations. Journal of Account-
ing, Auditing and Finance, 15, 415-445. https://doi.org/10.
1177%2F0148558X0001500401
Plummer, E., & Mest, D. (2001). Evidence of the man-
agement of earnings components. Journal of Accounting,
Auditing and Finance, 16, nž 4, 301-323. https://doi.org/
10.1177%2F0148558X0101600405
Rosner, R.L. (2003). Earnings manipulation in failing
firms. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2, 361-408. https:
//doi.org/10.1506/8EVN-9KRB-3AE4-EE81
Shapiro, S.S., & Wilk, M.B. (1965). An analysis of variance
test for normality (Complete samples). Biometrika, 52 (3&4),
591-611. https://doi.org/10.2307/2333709
Shen, C., & Chih, H. (2005). Investor protection, prospect
theory, and earnings management: An international compar-
ison of the banking industry. Journal of Banking and Fin-
ance, 29, 2675–2697. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.
2004.10.004
Siems, M. (2007). Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Fin-
ance and Comparative Law. McGill Law Journal, 52, 55-81.
Skinner, D., & Sloan, R. (2002). Earnings surprises,
growth expectations and stock returns or dont’t let an earn-
ings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies,
7, 289-312. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020294523516
Smirnov, N. V. (1939). On the estimation of the discrep-
ancy between empirical curves of distribution for two inde-
pendent samples. Bull. Math. Univ. Moscow, 2 (2), 3-14.
Swastika, D.L. (2013). Corporate Governance, Firm Size,
and Earnings management: Evidente in Indonesia stock ex-
change. Journal of Business and Management, 10 (4), 77-82.
Sweeney, A. (1994). Debt covenant violations and
managers’ accounting responses, Journal of Accounting
and Economics, 17, 281-308. https://doi.org/10.1016/
0165-4101(94)90030-2
White, H. (1980). A heteroscedasticity-consistent covari-
ance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroscedasticity.
Econometrica, 817838. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912934
Zhang, Y., Perols, J., Robinson, D., & Smith, T. (2018).
Earnings management strategies to maintain a string of meet-
ing or beating analyst expectations. Advances in Accounting,
43, 46-55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2018.09.001
S. Callao Gastón, J.I. Jarne Jarne / Revista de Contabilidad Spanish Accounting Review 24 (1)(2021) 75-89 87
Annex 1: Variables definition
Variables in equation (1)
mean
CARjt  is the variable quantifying the average reward
(or penalty) in market j in period t for meeting (or failing)
to meet earnings forecasts. It is defined as the mean of the
absolute values of cumulative abnormal return in a -1+1
window around the earnings announcement date for firms
listed in index j in period t. See computation in Annex 2.
LEGj is a dichotomous variable representing the legal sys-
tem of country j, taking value 0 for common law and value
1 for code law, according to the classification by Djankov
et al. (2007).
F IN DEVj measures the level of financial development for
country j by the variable Finance-Aggregate taken from
Beck and Levine, (2002).
AFOLLit is the number of analysts following the company i
in period t ("INC1NET" from I/B/E/S).
ACCit is the absolute difference between actual earnings
("WC01751" from DATASTREAM) and earnings forecast
("INC1MN" from I/B/E/S) scaled by earnings forecast for
company i in period t.
lGDPjt is the logarithm of GDP per capita for country j in
period t (data from World Bank).
Variables in equation (2)
I T V Eit is the variable which represents the incentive of firm
i in period t to manage earnings upward to meet earnings
forecasts. Its value will be 1 for firms with the incentive
to manage earnings and 0 otherwise. See computation in
Annex 2.
mean
CARjt−1 is the variable quantifying the average re-
ward (or penalty) in market j in period t-1 for meeting
(or failing) to meet earnings forecasts. It is defined as the
mean of the absolute values of cumulative abnormal return
in a -1+1 window around the earnings announcement date
for firms listed in index j in period t-1. See computation in
Annex 2.
LIQit is the liquidity ratio for firm i in period t, which
we define as the quotient between the current assets
("WC02201" from DATASTREAM) and current liabilities
("WC03101" from DATASTREAM).
SOLVit is the solvency ratio for firm i in period t, which
we define as the quotient between the total assets
("WC02999") and total liabilities ("WC03351") (data ex-
tracted from DATASTREAM).
DEBTit is the debt ratio for firm i in period t, which we
define as the quotient between the liabilities ("WC03351")
and equity ("WC03501") (data extracted from DATA-
STREAM).
ROIit is the return-on-investment for firm i in period t, which
we define as the quotient between the operating profits
("WC01250") and total assets ("WC02999") (data extrac-
ted from DATASTREAM).
SI Z Eit measures the size of firm i in period t, and we define
it using the asset ("WC02999") logarithm (data extracted
from DATASTREAM).
varGDPjt is the percentage variation of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) between year t and t-1 in the country in
which market j is located (data from World Bank)
rotMKTjt is a proxy of the liquidity of market j in period t,
which is defined as the quotient between the trade volume
("VO") and the market capitalization ("MVC") at the end of
year t (data extracted from DATASTREAM)
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Annex 2. Computation of mean|CAR| and ITVE variables
mean|CAR| variable
First, the abnormal return of a share is calculated as the
difference between the actual return obtained minus the ex-
pected return (equation a).
ARid = Rid − ERid (a)
Where:
ARid is the abnormal return for share i on day d
Rid is the actual return obtained, adjusted for di-
vidends and capital increases, for share i on day d
ERid is the expected return for share i on day d
The expected return is obtained from the ordinary least-
squares estimate of the market-model parameters (equation
b) for every year from 2006 to 2015 period.
ERid = αi + βi MRd + ei (b)
Where:
ERid is the expected return for share i on day d.
MRd is the market return on day d, measured by the
change in the corresponding index (IBEX, FTSE, DOW,
DAX, BOVESPA, HANG-SENG).
ei is the model’s error term.
After estimating the model’s parameters, we calculated the
abnormal return based on equality (c), where ai and bi are
the estimated values of parameters αi and βi:
ARid = Rid − (ai + bi MRd) (c)
The cumulative abnormal return in every stock (CARi) is
obtained by aggregating the abnormal returns in the days on
which we observed greater reaction in price of share to the





In model (1), proposed to test the hypothesis H1, we intro-
duced the mean|CARjt| variable, which is the mean of abso-
lute values of CAR (|CAR|) for the firms listed in market j in
period t (equality e). We use the absolute value of CAR be-
cause we aim to quantify market reward (CAR would have









Where: N is the total number of firms in the sample listed
in index j.
In equation 2, proposed to test hypothesis H2, we use
mean|CARjt-1|. We introduce the reward (or penalty) with
a delay period because the manager’s incentive to meet ana-
lysts’ forecasts will depend on the reaction of the market in
the past (t-1).
ITVE variable
It is a dichotomous variable which identifies the incent-
ive to upwardly manage earnings to meet earnings forecasts
(value 1). The value is 0 for firms without the incentive to
manage earnings upwards to meet forecasts because they
meet them without earnings management. The process to
assign values 1 or 0 is the following:
We extracted the actual earnings values for the financial
period from DATASTREAM and the forecast values for this
variable three months before the close date from the I/B/E/S
database. We calculated the deviation from actual earnings
compared with earnings forecast based on equality (f), to ar-
rive at the deviation for each firm and year:
Dit = [AEit − EFit]/|EFit | (f)
Where:
Dit is the deviation from actual earnings at the close
of the financial period t for firm i compared with the
earnings forecast three months previously;
AEit is the actual earnings for firm i at the close of
year t;
EFit is the earnings forecast for firm i for the financial
period t three months before the close date; and
|EFit | is the absolute value of the earnings forecast for
firm i for financial period t three months before the
close date.
From this point, we kept the sample firms for which the
deviation is positive (D>0), in other words, those for which
the actual earnings (AE) exceed earnings forecast (EF).
On the one hand, we identified firms in the set whose earn-
ings exceed the forecast without the need to manipulate, in
other words, firms for which meeting the forecasts does not
represent an incentive for earnings management. Using dis-
cretionary accruals (DA) as an earnings management meas-
ure, the part of the earnings that has not been managed
would be non-discretionary earnings (NDE), calculated in ac-
cordance with equality (g).
N DEit = AEit − DAit (g)
For companies with N DEit > EFit , they may have man-
aged earnings, but not seeking to meet earnings forecast, be-
cause they meet them without managing earnings.
On the other hand, there are companies in which non-
discretionary earnings are below earnings forecast (N DEit <
EFit). This is the group of companies for which meeting
analysts’ forecasts could be an important incentive to man-
age earnings. Given that non-discretionary earnings are be-
low the forecasts, this incentive would lead firms to man-
age earnings upwards using positive discretionary accruals
(DAit > 0).
For firms with non-discretionary earnings below the earn-
ings forecast (N DEit < EFit) but with negative discretionary
accruals, (DAit < 0), meeting earnings forecasts is not an ob-
jective leading to an incentive for earnings management. As
we stated above, these cases have been excluded from the
regression given that the AE will never be more than the EF,
in other words never D>0.
Consequently, we define the ITVE variable as a dichotom-
ous variable whose value is 1 for firms in which N DEit < EFit
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and DAit > 0 (having the incentive to manage earnings up-
wards to meet forecasts, they do so), and value 0 otherwise,
in other words, when N DEit > EFit (firms without the incent-
ive to manage earnings upwards to meet analysts’ forecasts).
To assign values 1 or 0 to the ITVE variable we must first
measure the level of earnings management in the firms in
the sample. As mentioned above, we will base this on the
estimate of the discretionary accruals (DA).
Discretionary Accruals estimation: We apply the model pro-
posed by Dechow et al. (1995) (equation h) for each in-
dex, using the cross-sectional method and covering the years















TAit is the total accruals for firm i in period t, which
has been calculated using the difference between ac-
tual earnings (AE) and cash flow from operations
(CFO): TAit = AEit − C FOit .
ΔSALEit is the change in sales for firm i in period t
compared with t-1.
ΔRECit is the change in receivables for firm i in
period t compared with t-1.
PPEit is property, plant and equipment for firm i in
period t.
Ait−1 is the total assets figure for firm i in period t-1
and we have used it as a deflator to prevent heteros-
cedasticity problems8.
eit is the error term for firm i in period t.
Data were extracted from DATASTREAM.
After estimating the equation (h) parameters, we used
these estimated values to predict total accruals for the ana-
lysis period (from 2007 to 2015), and to calculate the predic-



















Where: DAit is the discretionary accruals for firm i in period t
and a1, a2 and a3 are the estimated values of parameters α1
to α3.
8We also used the procedure proposed by White (1980) to obtain
estimates consistent with the presence of heteroscedasticity.
